# Reasoning and Choice by Paul M. Sniderman download in pdf, ePub, iPad

On the other hand, it is well known that the perception of two remaining options in the final choice induces the misapplication of the equiprobability principle Johnson-Laird et al. Specifically, decision makers commonly develop a wrong intuition that final probabilities are equally distributed, together with a preference for their first choice.

In line with the associative account introduced to explain the observed dissociation between reasoning and choice, Stibel et al. Adequate cognitive resources, specific knowledge related to the task, confidence in the intuitive response, and thinking dispositions engagement or laziness of the reflective mind. In the mentioned experiment of Franco-Watkins et al. Unfortunately, none of these latter studies reported probabilistic judgments of the participants. Incomplete representation of prior and conditional probabilities.

Although explicit feedback increased frequency of switching, it was not helpful for improving explicit probabilistic judgments. The equiprobability illusion and emotional-based choice biases. Results showed that the three-arrangements version promoted more correct responses. Based on this assumption, Burns and Wieth hypothesized that a context more clearly presenting the causes that determine the elimination of an option would enhance reasoning.

Emotional-based choice biases and cognitive limitations in understanding probabilistic information. The first chapter does a very nice job of outlining the underlying theme of the book and the substantive chapters are first-rate. However, based on the results of Stibel et al.

Not only do people find switching and losing highly aversive, they also appear to perceive switching and winning as less rewarding than sticking and winning Franco-Watkins et al. In most studies it is assumed that people have an accurate representation of the different probabilities before the elimination event that is, before inducing the equiprobability illusion. However, the elimination of an option known by the host not to contain the prize does not change the prior probability concerning the first choice.

In one of Franco-Watkins et al. However, modest improvements in probability judgments have been observed after guided explanations. More directly, Tubau and Alonso asked participants to represent the different possibilities from both perspectives. The need to distinguish a winning probability that has to be updated the one concerning the remaining door from a winning probability that remains the same the one concerning the first choice. It could be argued that such conditions hampered the motivation of the participants and, accordingly, their attention to the relevant contingencies was diminished.